A Conversation On Diplomacy, Public Service, and Its Future with Former Career Diplomat John Johnson

by ​Nikita Nikishin & david baker

Interview

John Johnson is a former diplomat and career senior foreign service officer who served for over two decades in the US State Department. In our conversation, Mr. Johnson highlighted many constants and changes within the State Department, especially with regard to a potential return to regionalism, and discussed many current and future challenges faced by the next generation of the United States Foreign Service. He highlighted the uniquely human aspects of diplomacy and discussed the potential for Artificial Intelligence to be more of a boon than a burden in aiding diplomatic efforts. Lastly, he discussed the need for the American public to engage with foreign affairs and how future diplomats can reinvigorate domestic support to rebuild trust and respect abroad. 
​
Nikita Nikishin: Thank you for taking the time to share insights on diplomacy and your civil service experience. It's always a pleasure to interview a fellow Husky. During your time here at the University of Washington, you studied Russian. Among many skills, knowing a foreign language is vital to a diplomat. To what extent did your background in a foreign language help your work? And what are some other skills and qualities that you saw in yourself and other leaders in the civil service?

Mr. Johnson: I think a facility with a foreign language is invaluable, but you really have to be good at it. If you're just okay at it, it's not really worth anything. What being good at a foreign language does is open the door to a completely different conversation than you would have had if you were operating with a translator and only operating in English. Although I never served in Moscow, despite multiple attempts, I was able to use it in different places that were completely surprising. It's amazing how often Russian came in handy. Before each tour, you learn a language. And I will say that my experience and my ability to influence my interlocutors were probably 50% greater when I had the language.


Nikita: How often do you see multiple languages being used? Are most Foreign Service officers capable of speaking multiple languages?


Mr. Johnson: Most of them haven't had exposure to multiple languages. Whether they're capable of speaking or not is something different. I will say, having served the last seven years in Brussels, Belgium, and three of those in NATO, that obviously, our European colleagues all have multiple languages. It’s just assumed. And it was a boon to me to have relatively fluent Russian and fluent Latvian from my parents. And I would use each of those languages almost every day. And again, the difference in the conversation I had when I was speaking to a Latvian and laughing with a Latvian versus speaking English with them was night and day. I think your ability to do your job as a diplomat is really heightened when you have a foreign language.


I’ve known a number of friends and colleagues over the years who grew up speaking another language as I did. And they are invaluable to the Foreign Service because they can get to the next level of their influence and work very quickly.


David: Much of the focus on strategy has been on the military or intelligence fields. From your experience, what are some of the ways diplomats can help promote strategic goals?


Mr. Johnson: I'll just take a step back and talk about what diplomacy is versus the military side or the intelligence side. The military does what they do very well, but generally, when we're using the military, it's usually a failure of diplomacy. The intelligence community informs diplomatic and political decisions. They do that very well. There are two ways to look at what we do as diplomats: we are conductors and gardeners. As conductors, we are able to use the entire US government to achieve a policy goal. So we have military pressure we can apply, we can use intelligence, we can use commercial pressure, all of those things.
And so if you have an ambassador at some of the embassies that I worked in, for example, in Indonesia, which is the fourth largest embassy in the world, we had 30 plus agencies represented, and the ambassador was in charge of all of those. In any negotiation, you could deploy any one of those assets to try to encourage our counterparts and our interlocutors to see our way. Whether it was trade or whether it was military cooperation. So I think it's important to think of diplomats both as conductors, but also as gardeners, tending relationships over time.


While the intelligence services and the military sometimes just go in for one particular thing, we're the ones who are there doing it every day, every week, over years and years and years, which allows us to see around corners better, and then to strategically think about how we can avoid possible crises, because we have that ability and the relationships to better understand what's happening in that country.

David: You touched on this earlier about how the military and intelligence go in for one reason, one purpose, and the diplomats are there every day, every week, working on everything. What were some cases where the military and the diplomats didn't agree on the overall strategy, and were they more or less prominent during crises?


Mr. Johnson: The best example is Kabul. I mean, we were on different pages. And I was there during the two months before Kabul fell, and then I was there during the evac, and then I was the deputy ambassador after the fact in Doha, when we reconstituted the mission.
You could probably tell in the press that the United States -the President, and therefore the State Department- wanted to project the idea that we still believed in the Afghan government, and that we were going to maintain a persistent presence there. At the same time, the military was pulling out of our airbase there and withdrawing troops, as was NATO.


And so we had this conflict in messaging. I think the military was planning for a non-combatant evacuation, and we were still trying to project the message that the United States was a persistent presence, because we didn't want what happened to happen, which is that once people saw that the U.S. was leaving and that we might have lost faith in the Afghan government, everybody fled for the exits. 


That was a failure of diplomacy, internal diplomacy. There are multiple reasons for that. I'm not going to target any particular individual, but it's the head of the mission, so the ambassador or the Secretary of State or whoever happens to be in charge of that particular issue, whose job is to bring everybody together under one vision and to pursue a foreign policy goal, as stated by the President. In that case, I think we were on different pages, and we saw the result. 


Nikita: I'll follow up with a different obstacle for diplomats. One obstacle comes from disagreement, from the military branch. Another obstacle just comes with bureaucracy, because that comes with government. In such a long career, it's safe to assume you encountered a lot of bureaucratic obstacles. What was the best way you managed them? And how did you see yourself and other leaders in the civil service managing bureaucracy? Because that can be a real turnaround for young people who would want to enter the foreign service.


Mr. Johnson: There are two ways to look at the bureaucracy. I will say off the bat that I'm deeply frustrated and always have been deeply frustrated with the pace at which our bureaucracy moves and the obstacles they throw in the way of any fast-moving idea.
If you have a chance, you should read Bill Byrne's book, The Back Channel. He was the Deputy Secretary of State and the head of the CIA. He talks about both the pros and the cons of bureaucracy.


The pros are that it sometimes slows down bad decisions. A small example is the clearance process. Let's say I'm writing a brief or a speech for an ambassador. Before I submit it to the ambassador, I have to go through the clearance process. And so, I submit it to every section in the embassy, and every section of the embassy takes a look at it. What comes out of the back end of a clearance process is usually painfully boring because everybody has torn it apart and put it back together again in extremely bureaucratic language. And it's our job as a speechwriter or a public diplomacy professional to make it sound interesting again. But what does that do? It allows us to avoid making enormous mistakes in public. And the clearance process happens with not just speeches, but with internal memos and policy papers, and so on and so forth.


The process is painfully frustrating: if you ask anybody who served in the State Department, they would say it was the worst part of the job, but it is necessary in some ways. Honestly, I think most of diplomacy is the last three feet that Edward R. Murrow talked about. You can talk all you want, but until you get in front of somebody at a table, it's really difficult to solve those issues. The way I got around bureaucracy was finding the one key person who was slowing things down and walking over to their office and knocking on their door and sitting down and saying, “Hey, can we work this out?” 99% of the time, it works. And it's amazing.


Nikita: AI is going to be a fundamental disruptor for every field, throughout the private and public sectors. People claim it will change everything about human work and organization. I wanted to ask you: to what extent, and how fast, would you see the diplomatic corps adapting to integrate AI into, for example, the bureaucracy process, and the speech review process? Are there any setbacks with this, or are there any potential boons? 


Mr. Johnson: It's a great question. I think the day-to-day work of diplomacy is about relationships. And I don't see AI affecting that too much.


But I do see it making us more efficient and maybe making us able to move a little bit faster. The State Department has never been known for moving quickly. And when I started in 2001, we still had WANG computers at our desks with no internet connection. We've come a long way since then.


I see AI helping the State Department stay relevant. When I left the State Department, we were using AI to create imagery, cartoons, that kind of thing, to better explain foreign policy to populations that don't think or want to think about foreign policy. And that was just in the last year or so. I know some of my colleagues were using AI to help draft the ambassador's speeches by training the AI using past speeches to pump out new speeches on a new topic.
So we're adopting it, but it might not be as fast as in the private sector.


Nikita: That builds into another question I wanted to ask. One of the fundamental concerns about AI is that it replaces human labor, and it might replace some of the quality found in human labor. It would also, therefore, replace human connection.


There's a book on the American legal system by Philip Howard, where he comments that human activity can't be regulated without judgment by humans. He wrote this in the 90s. He didn't know about AI. Diplomacy, as you've described it to us today, is a uniquely human activity and is built on trust, relationships, and engagement. So, to that end, are the realists correct when they assert that logic and cold calculus are what guide diplomatic interaction? Because if they are, then AI could replace a lot of the human aspects of diplomacy.


Mr. Johnson: When you join the Foreign Service, you take what they used to call the A100 class.


It's your induction class. In the first days, they say to you, you've been hired for your judgment. And that is 100% true.


In the State Department, we don't get nearly as much specialized training as the intelligence sector or the military. They get training on very specific things that they have to do. At the State Department, we have our judgment, and our judgment is critical.


We're trusted to be in brutal situations like Kabul or run-of-the-mill day-to-day diplomacy like I've done in five other countries, and make choices. Could AI look at two options and, again, in a cold, calculating way, say, well, here are the benefits for this one, and here are the benefits for that one? Yes, but it can't make the final choice. Diplomats still need to be there to make that choice.


And I will also say that a lot of the arm-twisting and the conversations that happen in the background, that's real diplomacy. That's what's happening right now, what just happened in Florida with the Ukrainians and Secretary Rubio and others, what will be happening in Moscow, AI will never replace that. It's about people, and it's about judgment.  


David: You've talked a lot about judgment here, and I think that diplomatic judgment is going to become more and more important as the U.S. is losing its premier spot as the world's hyperpower, and China is rising to contest that spot. With that in mind, what do you think the future of American diplomacy is going to look like in an era where the U.S. may still be the world's dominant economic and military power, but is losing influence compared to other nations? 


Mr. Johnson: Well, I'm not sure I agree with the premise of your question.
Perhaps we are losing economic power to China. China's approach to diplomacy is very different from ours. Their interaction with fellow diplomats is very, very different. It can be very mercantilist: very straightforward, cut and dry. The US is still operating on values and shared values, and that's how we approach some of our fellow countries and diplomats, working with a shared understanding of how the world should work, a shared respect for human rights. Those are two very different approaches.


I don't agree that we are necessarily a falling power. I agree that China is definitely a rising power. I also think that both approaches have their benefits, but I still feel like the U.S. approach has had better results over time.


Nikita: I wanted to follow up on that. So the U.S., for example, has also withdrawn from multiple international organizations, where its membership in these organizations changes from administration to administration, regardless of party. It's become a partisan issue for some reason.


Because of that, we see that trust in the United States and the ability of the United States to stay committed to international partnerships and goals, these shared values that you talked about, might go down. So, how would you advise the next generation of young diplomats to work around rebuilding that trust? 


Mr. Johnson: It's a great point, and I do 100% agree with you on that. I think the biggest loss that we've taken over the past 10 years has been a loss of trust in the U.S., and as we all know, trust is hard to create but easy to lose.


I think we have lost a lot of trust because of our entry and exit from the Paris Accord, for example, among others. It puts us in a bit of a tough spot. I was at NATO, President Biden visited, and his big speech was, “The U.S. is back,” and Macron's response to that was, “Okay, for how long?” That sort of summarizes our place in the world right now: people don't trust us from one administration to the next to maintain and uphold those values that we always had in the past. I would advise anybody thinking about going into diplomacy right now or the State Department that this is an immense opportunity, because I think there will be a rebuilding phase. And it's going to take a long time, and it's going to take a lot of dedication, and it's going to take a lot of judgment and relationships over the next 5, 10, 20 years to restore that trust in the United States so that we can have conversations on the same level playing field that we've had in the past.


Nikita: Earlier, you came to a Rainier Institute panel on U.S. soft power, and we touched upon this idea that the United States, in the next 10 to 20 years, would slowly change its presence in Asia. What would you say, having served, for example, in Indonesia for so long, your perspective on that change would look like? Would it be more of an economic diplomacy as we used to practice? Would it be a focus on international partnerships, on organizations like ASEAN?

Mr. Johnson: It's a great question. I think it's probably a mix of military and economic diplomacy.


That's how China approaches it, military and economic. If we're going to compete with China, then we need to be participating in the same spaces. I think TPP back in the day, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, was designed to create a place where we could bring together our allies in an economic space and compete with China more effectively.


I think some of the basing deals that you've seen and some of the deployment of our military in that region have certainly worked to push back against China's sometimes aggressive posture. I think we'll continue on that path, but I also think that our soft power is still more powerful than China's. In Indonesia and Cambodia, when I was there, there was a deep respect and a thirst for American culture. And that's something China doesn't have.
And I think that over the long term, soft power will help us maintain our foothold in those countries and in that region. China will try to develop that thirst for their culture, but they are not there yet. 


David: At the Rainier Institute Panel, you talked about how the US is returning to a more Western Hemisphere focus. How do you think that will affect US diplomatic efforts across the world, particularly in Asia and Europe?


Mr. Johnson: We still have to be out there doing that job. And that's why we have embassies in all these countries. And so while we say that we're pivoting away from Europe, are we really? I'm not so sure.


The whole pivot to Asia was really frustrating for the Europeans during the Obama administration, because it implied that we were turning our back on Europe. I'm not entirely sure that pivot is happening yet. We're obviously still deeply involved in Europe. You know, the European Union is an enormous economy and an enormous trading partner. What's happening in Ukraine right now is attracting our attention. I think that's been the great frustration of my fellow Asian experts, because they feel like we are moving towards addressing China. And then something blows up in Europe. Now, the United States is a big country, and we can walk and chew gum at the same time. I think we're doing that.


In fact, I find those terms about pivoting to be not terribly useful, because I think we can do both. I think we can be engaging in Europe, and we can be trying to find a peaceful solution to Ukraine, and engaging and competing with China, and being present in Southeast Asia at the same time. We can do all of those things. We don't have to shift resources around every time a new administration comes in to approach one particular issue.


Nikita: One of the biggest issues in American foreign policy is that the average American voter doesn't really care about it too much. In polling, we see that the primary focus for the upcoming midterms is going to be the economy, followed by money in politics, and followed by healthcare/Social Security. The concerns of the electorate are very much domestic, which is why American foreign policy often gets the short end of the stick. And as you said, something blows up in Europe. So the question I'm going to ask you is, how would future civil servants go about promoting the necessity of foreign affairs and diplomacy to the American people to secure, for example, the resources to dedicate to both and focus on Europe and Asia? 


Mr. Johnson: You hit the core of our problem at the State Department. There are two things I'd say. First, we were precluded from talking to the U.S. population about foreign affairs and diplomacy for many, many years because of something called the Smith-Mundt Act. It was considered to be propagandizing the American public if we talked about what we were doing in the State Department.


That's why we don't have the constituency that the military has or some of the other branches of the government have. We were legally not allowed to talk to Americans about what we were doing overseas. So we're always the quiet diplomats behind the scenes. Sometimes what we do reduces prices, sometimes because of a trade agreement that's been negotiated for a long period of time. But we rarely have the opportunity to really crow about that and talk to Americans about that directly. The problem with what we do is it's very subtle, and it's very nuanced, and it takes a lot of time and a lot of conversations to make something happen.


That's hard to sell to the American people right now, unfortunately. During the Biden administration, Secretary Blinken had an initiative called Foreign Policy for the Middle Class. He really wanted us to link what we did overseas to middle class Americans. We had officials from the State Department going out and talking to Americans about the real effect that foreign affairs and foreign policy can have on their lives.


It's a deep, deep problem for the foreign affairs community, talking to people about our values. Because without a constituency, how do we get funding? We don't have a base in Alabama that employs 50,000 people. It's pretty easy to get money for that, but it's much harder to get money for the State Department if people can't concretely think about what benefit we have to the American people. 


David: Building on that, what are some ways that young diplomats or even people just interested in foreign affairs here at the University or throughout the world can help build that constituency for the State Department and help show the American people that foreign affairs is one of the easiest ways to promote American interests abroad?


Mr. Johnson:  I think you really have to focus on the economic aspect and economic diplomacy, and that's something we haven't been super good at, but I think it's something that we're getting better at. Those trade agreements ensure that there's a level playing field for US companies in foreign countries. That's something that we do, and that's something that has a direct impact on this consumer. I think finding new markets for US businesses, which grows our economy and our stock market, is important. I think those are relatively easy arguments to make to the American people. None of those things happens without our embassies, our diplomats, our ambassadors, creating that space for us to operate in. I think that's probably the best angle.


Nikita: One conversation I have had with my immigrant grandparents was about government salaries, because they don't know what that looks like in the United States. For example, they ask, “How much does a foreign service officer make?” And when I tell them, they say, “That little?” Government service is just that, it's service, it's a commitment. You're trading off other benefits to serve your country. There are benefits in government service, but there are also a lot of Americans with talent who get stolen away by the private sector because it's hard for public service to compete. So to that end, I wanted to ask, can you discuss the nature of civil service as service, the reward implicit in that, and also the importance of maybe prioritizing a return to merit in the future state department? Because the current and past administrations have moved away from appointing career diplomats for high-level positions and have instead prioritized political appointees.


Mr. Johnson: Look, I joined the State Department because of what you just said. I wanted to serve my country. There are multiple ways to serve your country. My interest in foreign affairs and my background mean that serving in the State Department made more sense to me. Service has always been primary for me, and everything else secondary. That and making a difference. I felt like the Foreign Service was the one place where I could make a concrete difference in people's lives across the board. I felt that just about every day when I was overseas working as a diplomat, I think you will still find students that you talk to today who, given a choice to walk out and make $250,000 in a tech company, still work for half that or less at the State Department. But living overseas doing a service for your country? A lot of them still choose that. The US government's never competitive salary-wise. But there are, there are other reasons to pursue your career that are beyond money. Lots of people move in and out. If you look at the Justice Department, there are plenty of lawyers who graduated from Harvard Law, who clerked with some of the justices and judges in the country, who pride themselves on serving in the Justice Department and doing that service, and then they make money later. I think that it could be a model for the State Department as well. But I think those of us who come in do so with a sense of a need and desire to be of service and to serve our country. I think that's a winning argument for a lot of people.


Nikita: What would be some advice you’d give to young diplomats who will probably be doing the hard work of rebuilding trust, rebuilding relationships, and navigating all these technological, climate, and political issues that the world is going to face?


Mr. Johnson: I would just say that the next five to ten years should be seen as an opportunity. Rebuilding our presence abroad is going to take skills that a lot of us don't have right now, and the State Department may not have, so being intimately familiar with AI and how it can make work more efficient and better. Really, aspiring diplomats should have an understanding of our foreign policy, the core of our foreign policy, be educated on what diplomats have done over the last 50 or 100 years, and look at the past and other times that we've had to rebuild our relationship with the world. I think having a familiarity with those aspects of diplomacy would be a huge boon to anybody who's considering entering the diplomatic field and working for the State Department or some other foreign affairs agency going forward.

David: Thank you for your time. We really appreciate it. 


Mr. Johnson: Thank you both.

Nikita Nikishin is the Copy Editor at the Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs and is a second-year student studying Economics, Political Science: International Security, and Philosophy at the University of Washington. 
David Baker is the Vice President and Security/Diplomacy Director of the Rainier Institute of Foreign Affairs, and is a fourth-year student studying Political Science and Data Science at the University of Washington.