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Bolivia's Opening: Can the U.S. Compete Where China Has a lead?

10/29/2026

1 Comment

 
By Nathaniel Kent
​
Policy Recommendation
Bolivia sits atop the world’s largest lithium resources, but decades of stalled development have left its potential largely untapped. Now, as the new president, Rodrigo Paz, opens the door to Washington, the United States has a chance to challenge China’s foothold in South America. However, a long-term relationship takes more than money and mining contracts: if the United States hopes to compete for influence across the Global South, it must learn from China’s missteps and prove that American partnership can deliver for communities caught between great-power ambitions.

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Photo by Nathaniel Kent
An Unusual Diplomatic Opening

During his visit to New York last month for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The purpose of the meeting, according to the Bolivian government, was “to work on the development of Bolivia, bilateral relations, cooperation, trade and markets” as part of Paz’s effort to rebuild relations with the United States after a 17-year freeze under the rule of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party.

The meeting offers the United States a diplomatic opening in a country where China has built a significant economic and diplomatic presence. Chinese companies and suppliers have become critical to Bolivia’s trade and extractive sectors in the United States’ absence. Part of the motivation for the opening is the Paz administration’s need to diversify access to capital and international financing as it confronts a severe economic crisis. Those priorities overlap with American interests in strengthening alliances in South America and diversifying critical-mineral supply chains.

As the U.S.-China competition intensifies across the Global South, Bolivia’s lithium resources offer an opportunity to diversify American supply chains and reduce dependence on Chinese markets. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that Bolivia has approximately 23 million metric tons of identified lithium resources, the largest lithium resources of any country. Bolivia’s strategic value extends beyond mineral deposits to regional security cooperation, migration, and trade. However, securing these interests requires more than security agreements or displacing Chinese firms. The United States must learn from its own past failures and from China’s investment-led approach by ensuring engagement benefits rural communities and builds credibility with the public. For Bolivians, this means making foreign investment visible in everyday life: reliable roads and electricity, opportunities for Bolivian businesses, and training that helps local workers maintain infrastructure and develop technical skills. Lithium projects must address communities’ concerns about environmental damage and whether the economic benefits will reach them. Delivering on these issues will help Bolivia develop its resources while giving the United States a more durable foundation for partnership.

Doing so also advances American strategic interests by diversifying supply chains for batteries used in green infrastructure, strengthening relationships across South America, and demonstrating how renewed U.S. engagement can produce practical returns. While the United States can expand domestic lithium production, it alone will not meet the growing global demand for green energy infrastructure. Partnerships with resource-rich countries such as Bolivia complement domestic efforts by reducing supply-chain vulnerabilities and ensuring the global energy transition is not dependent on a small number of suppliers. At a time when Americans are increasingly focused on domestic priorities, partnerships delivering tangible economic and strategic benefits to both sides offer a stronger case for sustained international engagement.

Bolivia is a test of whether the United States can offer a competitive economic model of engagement that advances American strategic interests amid competition with China, with lessons applicable to U.S. engagement across the Global South.

Bolivia’s Importance to the U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry

Bolivia offers a case study in how countries in the Global South navigate competition between major powers. The growing U.S.-China strategic rivalry has brought back the Cold-War era strategy of strategic non-alignment, wherein countries in the Global South seek investment, technology, and market access from competing powers while retaining the flexibility to pursue independent interests. China is Bolivia’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding USD $3.5 billion in 2024. Despite strong trade ties with China, Bolivia has struggled to build a commercial lithium-extraction industry, while neighboring Chile and Argentina (the three countries comprising the “Lithium Triangle,” the origin of 50-70% of the world’s lithium resources) have developed fully fledged sectors. Paz’s outreach to the United States then reflects an effort to diversify Bolivia’s economic and diplomatic options while preserving the ability to work with China, with the competition between the U.S. and China fueling this strategy.

Lithium is especially pertinent because the element is a critical component of green energy infrastructure, one of the most contentious areas of competition between the United States and China as both seek to capitalize on the shift to renewable energy. The strategic importance of Bolivian lithium extends beyond competition with China. As the United States seeks to diversify supplies of critical minerals used in batteries and other energy technologies, Bolivia’s vast lithium resources have become increasingly relevant to U.S. efforts to build more secure and resilient supply chains. 

Although Bolivia has pursued lithium development since the late twentieth century, efforts to attract foreign investment have repeatedly stalled; resource nationalism, political opposition, and indigenous opposition have all waylaid efforts to establish an industry. Under MAS, the government asserted state control over the sector, limiting the role private companies play in the market. Although this approach aimed to retain greater national control over the industry, it disincentivized foreign investment, leaving Bolivia far behind Chile and Argentina in commercial production. Paz is seeking to change that trajectory, proposing a new framework designed to attract investment. At the same time, his administration is reviewing agreements with Chinese companies and pledging to ensure communities surrounding extraction sites benefit. For the United States, the opening creates an opportunity to support the development of a strategically important industry, and a test of whether American engagement can help Bolivia build the institutional capacity, public confidence, and local partnerships needed to turn its mineral wealth into economic growth. If the United States can help Bolivia turn its lithium resources into a viable industry, it can demonstrate that American partnership offers the Global South more than access to capital and markets. If it fails, China will remain positioned to consolidate its foothold, underscoring the limits of U.S. efforts to compete for influence through commercial investment alone.

How Bolivia Became a Partner for China

China’s rising influence in Bolivia is shaped both by domestic politics and China’s global ambitions. Evo Morales and MAS won the 2005 election amid growing frustration across the country. The Cochabamba Water War of 2000 and Gas War of 2003 expressed public anger over the privatization of essential resources and distribution of economic benefits. Coca growers increasingly saw U.S.-supported eradication campaigns as a threat to their livelihoods, fomenting anger upon which Morales built his political base.

Once in power, Morales nationalized the hydrocarbon and extraction industry, using the increased state revenues to fund public programs. Relations with the United States evaporated. Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador and suspended cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 2008. Though Bolivia remained a member of the IMF and World Bank, it moved to a state-centered economic model less reliant on U.S.-aligned institutions for aid. Buoyed by the revenues from nationalization, Bolivia continued this model for more than a decade. However, the state's control over the lithium sector limited foreign participation and contributed to the slow pace of industrial development.

In 2006, MAS began to look to new sources for foreign investment and funding to move away from US and Bretton Woods funding. China offered an opportunity: its policy banks could finance infrastructure projects through loans tied to Chinese contractors, giving Bolivia access to capital without policy conditions associated with Western institutions. This arrangement enabled Bolivia to reduce dependence on Western finance, while also serving China’s interests by expanding markets for firms, creating an economic foothold in Latin America. In 2018, Morales and Chinese President Xi Jinping elevated the relationship to a strategic partnership, with Bolivia endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative. 

Much of this cooperation took the form of state-to-state agreements and contracts for Chinese firms. Research by the London School of Economics’ Global South Unit describes how Chinese finance for infrastructure often operated through a turnkey model, in which Chinese contractors were entirely responsible for projects, using equipment, procurement channels, and personnel imported from China. This arrangement allowed projects to move swiftly but excluded Bolivians from participating in the newly created jobs and industries. This model of development allowed China to create headlines in Bolivia, such as the launch and delivery of Bolivia’s first satellite, but because it excluded Bolivian populations, it helped to fuel a political divide which would contribute to the end of MAS rule.
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Figure 1: Map of the Lithium Triangle. Identified lithium deposits are in orange. Image Credit: IDRC. 
Where Chinese Engagement Fell Short

China remains an important trading partner for Bolivia, but Bolivia’s experience illustrates a central limitation of economic statecraft: investment does not automatically translate into political capital, especially as Chinese investment failed to impact the rural community Bolivia’s development strategy was created to benefit. Chinese engagement expanded trade and financed industrial projects, yet this activity relied on turnkey arrangements that kept Chinese firms preeminent. Without skills transfer and opportunities for Bolivians to participate, these projects failed to build domestic capacity. Environmental concerns and inadequate consultation compounded these problems, further highlighting the failure of China’s investment model to meaningfully engage with Bolivian communities.

Lithium demonstrates these shortcomings. In November 2024, state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos signed a US$1.03 billion agreement with the Chinese CBC consortium to develop direct-lithium-extraction plants. The proposals promised to accelerate Bolivia's transition to commercial production but provoked opposition in Potosí and the Nor Lípez region, where residents affected by extractive industries raised concerns about environmental impacts and inadequate prior consultation. Additionally, more than US$2 billion in lithium projects involving Chinese and Russian partners faced scrutiny from 14 communities surrounding the Salar de Uyuni over environmental protections. These disputes show how prioritizing capital investment without sufficient attention to local participation and community concerns enabled China to expand its economic presence but struggled to generate lasting political goodwill. 

Adding to these concerns was China's reliance on a turnkey development model centered on large projects that often struggled to deliver the transformative results originally promised. Projects such as the Túpac Katari satellite and the El Mutún steel complex were promoted as symbols of Bolivia's industrial modernization and strategic partnership with China. However, projects often failed to live up to demands, with satellite infrastructure being fully outsourced to China and the steel plant having produced little to no steel for Bolivia. Although these projects were intended to expand infrastructure and industrial capacity, they did not produce the rapid economic transformation that Bolivian leaders had presented to the public.

The political consequences of this should be understood within Bolivia's wider economic crisis. Public skepticism toward Chinese investment intensified as many Bolivians saw development projects exclude local populations while not contributing to the country’s economic output, as Bolivia simultaneously faced declining natural-gas production, fuel and foreign-currency shortages, and growing political divisions within MAS. As Reuters reported, these broader economic pressures contributed significantly to the party's defeat in the 2025 election. The failure of Chinese engagement to deliver visible and widely shared benefits reinforced perceptions that the government's development strategy was not producing the prosperity it had promised. In this way, Chinese-backed projects became intertwined with broader dissatisfaction over economic performance and governance, contributing to the erosion of the MAS development model.

China’s experience shows the limits of a partnership measured predominantly through trade and investment. The lesson for the United States is that effective economic statecraft must invest in a country's people as well as its economy. Infrastructure and resource partnerships will generate lasting influence only when working-class Bolivians are treated as full participants.

Rodrigo Paz and the Opening to the United States

Rodrigo Paz’s 2025 victory reflected dissatisfaction with Bolivia’s economic trajectory and the breakdown of MAS’s political coalition. After two decades of MAS dominance, voters faced declining natural-gas production, fuel shortages, depleted foreign-exchange reserves, inflation, and conflict within MAS. In the end, Paz won 54.96 percent of the vote in the runoff. The official election results confirmed a decisive shift, though Paz entered office without an outright majority in the legislature.

Paz campaigned on “capitalism for all,” promising to expand private-sector participation, attract foreign investment, and restore economic stability after years of mounting fiscal and currency pressures. His administration sought to rebuild international reserves, ease shortages of dollars and fuel, and create jobs by opening Bolivia’s mining, energy, and other productive sectors to private capital. In September 2026, lawmakers approved a USD $1.9 billion International Monetary Fund program intended to stabilize the economy and help unlock further financing from other development institutions. Paz used his September visit to New York to pursue a broader agenda with the United States, underscoring the administration’s effort to turn international relationships into resources at home.

The security relationship has already changed. Bolivia resumed operational cooperation with the DEA in February after a 17-year suspension, and the government has engaged with the Shield of the Americas security framework. These moves create opportunities to work on transnational crime, but they also raise a familiar risk: if security becomes the defining purpose of the relationship, America will revive the grievances which initially damaged ties and mobilized coca-growing communities against the United States.

Paz wants to move beyond stalled state-led projects by establishing clear rules, attracting foreign technology and capital, and ensuring producing regions share in the resulting wealth. This pragmatic approach preserves Bolivia’s commercial ties with China while opening the sector to new partners, including the United States. The United States has the opportunity to support Bolivia’s development on terms that respect its sovereignty and demonstrate tangible benefits to Bolivians, allowing the United States to advance its strategic and economic interests through partnership rather than pressure.

What the United States Should Learn

For the United States, Bolivia’s lithium reserves offer an opportunity to diversify critical-mineral supply chains, while cooperation against transnational criminal networks serves American regional security interests. Both countries have reasons to restart dialogue: Bolivia needs capital, technology, and access to international markets, while the United States wants dependable partners and stronger economic ties in a region where Chinese influence has grown. The challenge is to turn this opening into a durable partnership without repeating the mistakes that undermined earlier American engagement.

First, the United States must make diplomacy as inclusive as Paz’s promise of “capitalism for all.” A renewed relationship cannot depend solely on high-level deals and agreements. Educational exchanges, technical training, and consultation on development projects are all embassy-level ways to rebuild credibility in areas where American counternarcotics policies left deep divides. Communities that can influence projects affecting their land, water, and livelihoods are more likely to view international investment as a legitimate means of improving their standard of living and have played an outsized role in the changing domestic politics of the country. In restarting relations with Bolivia, the United States needs to include average Bolivians as participants in the partnership.

Second, the United States must make lithium the cornerstone of a broader economic offer. The United States should help translate Paz’s agenda to create a more attractive economy for foreign investment into results. The US Trade and Development Agency can support feasibility studies and project preparation, while the Development Finance Corporation can mobilize private capital where projects meet investment criteria. Cooperation should extend beyond extraction to processing, transport, electricity, water management, and technical education. Contracts should address the concerns of communities near extraction sites, namely environmental safeguards, community consultation, and creating measurable opportunities for Bolivian workers and suppliers. These requirements address the issues that bogged down the Chinese-Bolivian partnership while creating a safer and more attractive environment for American firms. Rather than forceful displacement of Chinese firms, a softer approach will create a more durable relationship by helping Bolivia develop a viable industry delivering value within the country.


Third, the United States must learn from the backlash stemming from prior coca eradication campaigns and ensure that security cooperation operates within the bounds of Bolivian institutions. The return of DEA cooperation in 2026 creates an opening, but its scope remains subject to negotiation with Bolivian authorities. The United States should support Bolivian-led investigations through intelligence sharing and forensic training. Joint programs should operate with explicit authorization under Bolivian law, and with clear rules governing operational responsibility. Most important is host-country consent: Bolivian authorities should direct domestic enforcement with American assistance supporting their capacity. Doing so avoids the perception that security cooperation is an instrument of external pressure, a concern which contributed to the breakdown of U.S.-Bolivian relations during earlier counternarcotics campaigns. Programs that operate through Bolivian institutions are more likely to earn political legitimacy, survive changes in government, and sustain long-term cooperation. Given the history of eradication campaigns and the sensitivity of coca cultivation, durable cooperation will depend on respecting Bolivian sovereignty and distinguishing traditional coca use from cocaine trafficking.

China brings trade, financing, construction capacity, and an established commercial presence. The United States can offer the same but alongside educational exchanges, institutional cooperation, transparent project development, and sustained engagement with communities beyond the political elite. These advantages will matter only if the United States follows through. Bolivia is a test of whether the United States can turn a diplomatic opening into a partnership benefiting both countries, while strengthening its position in the competition with China.

Conclusion

Bolivia’s opening to America gives the United States an opportunity to strengthen its influence in a country where China has established deep commercial ties. Bolivia’s experience demonstrates how investment and infrastructure alone cannot guarantee a durable partnership. While Chinese engagement delivered trade and development projects, disputes over the distribution of economic benefits exposed the limits of an approach centered on agreements with national governments. These challenges underscore the importance of collaborating with local communities and strengthening institutions responsible for development.

The United States should learn from both China’s shortcomings and its own history in Bolivia. By pairing credible investment with people-to-people diplomacy and security partnerships that respect Bolivian sovereignty, the United States can offer a compelling alternative without requiring Bolivia to abandon its relationship with China. Ultimately, American influence will depend not on whether Bolivia chooses the United States over China, but on whether the United States becomes a partner Bolivians across society can trust to deliver lasting benefits. That lesson extends beyond Bolivia to a wider Global South, where durable influence depends as much on the quality of international partnerships as on the capital and resources they bring.

Nathaniel Kent is a fourth-year undergraduate student at the University of Washington studying civil engineering and international studies.
1 Comment
Sophia
10/29/2026 02:46:12 pm

Awesome analysis!

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