 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) add a unique dimension to the battlefields of the 21st century. The potential advantages of the technology have accelerated widespread adoption and innovation by militaries around the globe. The same advantages that allowed UAVs to reshape the battlefield have also enabled nonstate armed groups to target infrastructure, military, political, and civilian targets that were previously out of reach. Systems are cheap, operators are easy to train, and entire systems can be manufactured in-house with common tools and materials. As seen in Ukraine and Sudan, UAVs provide a significant advantage for a smaller, less resourced, and opportunistic armed group. Any force implementing UAV technology will understand its ability to force an opponent to make an expensive choice: either to expend significant resources defending from UAV systems or risk losing expensive or irreplaceable systems and infrastructure. Yet while global militaries innovate and theorize, there has been a complete absence of any coherent global or regional effort to limit the proliferation and availability of UAV technology. The technology is likely too widespread and embedded in regional conflicts for any new arms control mechanism to reliably limit its proliferation. Current Arms Control Mechanisms When dealing with non-state actors, effective arms control aims to limit the general availability of weapons systems and the components, ammunition, and experience needed to operate and maintain them. There are multiple mechanisms by which nations can slow the flow of arms into a conflict zone. The section below provides a brief overview of current means, before explaining why these methods may fall short regarding UAVs. Arms control treaties are always multilateral and always involve the participation of both regional and global actors. Such treaties target a specific class or category of weapon, and use a set of definitions and characteristics that determine whether or not a system falls under the scope of the treaty. Almost all arms control treaties work to limit an arms race between great powers or prohibit a particularly destructive or inhumane weapon of war. While providing a comprehensive mechanism for regulating state-to-state conflict, arms control treaties often lack enforcement mechanisms that can impede the efforts of non-state actor groups, which typically face no internal or external pressure to conform to international law. Negotiating a comprehensive treaty addressing drone technology would require a monumental and multinational effort. Such a push is highly unlikely, as many nations see their continued development of UAV technology as a vital part of future security competition in light of its widespread and effective use in ongoing conflicts. Arms embargoes are a more comprehensive and direct approach, as they involve active and well-resourced material efforts to reduce the availability of weapons. Arms embargoes target the suppliers of arms with sanctions, target the distribution of arms through interdiction efforts, and target existing weapons through confiscation and destruction. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) embargoes are the most multilateral and legitimate embargoes available to the international community. Regional embargoes and sanctions policies do not carry the legitimacy and multilateral weight of UNSC decisions, but are still effective mechanisms to reduce the flow of weapons into a warzone. However, the UNSC or smaller regional bodies have not taken any significant steps towards recognizing or targeting the threat posed by UAV systems. Most nations that can enforce arms embargoes are actively taking steps to ignore or bypass arms control provisions. The United States, Iran, Russia, and China have all worked to bypass existing international sanctions or arms control agreements when exporting UAV systems or experts. The efforts of regional actors and the commons are symbolic at best without agreement or participation from the United States, Russia, and China. As these nations continue to bypass existing international law, efforts to create new frameworks lose their momentum, and enforcing compliance with existing agreements becomes increasingly difficult. Ubiquity of UAV Technology: The nature of UAV technology makes any arms control initiatives inherently difficult. The widespread availability of UAV components as civilian commodities makes it far more difficult to monitor their sale and purchase. A determined group can avoid an arms embargo by ordering components piecemeal and assembling systems in-house. As far back as 2018, in-house systems have been used in non-state actor attacks on infrastructure. Given the availability of systems and their components on civilian markets, any conventional arms control that makes it through the UNSC or regional efforts simply won't be enough to deter non-state actors from acquiring systems or building their own. In order to reduce the threat, the international community has to innovate. Any effective measures would have to reduce both the availability of civilian UAVs on the market and the non-state actors' ability to manufacture systems in-house. Rather than a flat ban on systems, there can be a more effective ban on the components necessary to produce them in bulk, and upgrade system capabilities.  Image Source: https://www.aeriallive.nl/en/blog/how-does-a-drone-work/ As the diagram above indicates, all UAV systems require a set of similar basic components. Batteries, electric motors, and transmitters are complex electronic components that also contribute to the primary limitations that UAV systems face. These limitations are the operating range and the weight that a system is able to carry. Both operating range and payload are contingent on the quality and capacity of the system's battery, the reliability of its electric motors, and signal strength. These key aspects are what enable UAVs to make direct and long-distance attacks on infrastructure. Being able to restrict the flow of quality, high-capacity batteries and reliable electric components into a conflict zone would be a starting point for any future arms control or non-proliferation policy. Being able to reduce non-state actor access to 3D printing or CNC technology would also help target their ability to produce systems in-house. Ultimately, future policymakers will be limited in their options as the components and technology listed above are also essential for economic development, and armed groups can find components in everyday civilian items. Limiting the commercialization of technology would not fully deter a determined group, as they will always have the option to scavenge components or utilize the black market. Similar to how non-state actors were able to obtain Toyota pickup trucks that they then refitted as a tool of war, the second-hand market for systems and components could also provide a direct supply if not regulated or monitored. It is unlikely to be a global effort dedicated or comprehensive enough to implement a modernized approach to reducing UAV proliferation.
Conclusion The existing international framework that enables arms control has now become a barrier to its implementation, as conflicting interests and objectives reduce nations' ability to negotiate and compromise with other nations. The decay of the rules-based international order impedes any creation or implementation of an arms control treaty or organization. It is very unlikely that enough parties would agree to any multilateral mechanism to enforce compliance. Furthermore, regulating a wide range of everyday electronic components like batteries and electric motors would be a resource-intensive task, therefore making any international effort that much more difficult. It would also be difficult to convince nations to limit economic enterprise. Since regulation and arms control cannot fully reduce the threat, embattled governments would be forced to spend considerable resources to defend infrastructure targets against systems, resources that they may not possess. As global adoption of UAV systems continues, a failure to monitor or limit their proliferation could spell disaster for embattled governments and big players alike: UAVs do not discriminate in the advantage they confer. The economy of UAV technology and its ability to force an opponent to incur a loss when defending against it will empower non-state actors, and a global inability to limit proliferation poses a unique and difficult threat to the security situation in regions experiencing non-state conflict. Nikita Nikishin is the Copy Editor for the Rainier Institute and a second-year student at the University of Washington, studying Political Science, Economics, and Philosophy.
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