Avoiding Entanglement with Azerbaijan: Recommendations for US and Allied Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus

by Nick Tselikov

Policy Analysis & Recommendation

As wars rage in the Middle East and Europe, the South Caucasus has emerged as an important area for powers in both regions to maneuver against their adversaries. Azerbaijan has been at the center of such activities, with its recent foreign policy pivot from soft balancing between competing powers to bandwagoning with the United States, Israel, and Turkey against Russia and Iran. This threatens to embroil the United States and its allies in large-scale crises in the region, which the former should avoid through a policy of restrained cooperation with Azerbaijan.

---

Photo courtesy of The White House.

The South Caucasus, home to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, is a region often overlooked in foreign affairs, yet it occupies a strategically vital position between the Middle East and Europe. The instability in its neighboring regions of the Middle East and Eastern Europe has greatly affected its political affairs. Israeli attacks on Iran have further strengthened Azeri-Israeli cooperation, and with Russian forces bogged down in Ukraine, Azerbaijan was able to establish full control of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia in 2023, Russia’s de jure ally. These events have pushed Azerbaijan away from its historical soft-balancing strategy to one of bandwagoning with Turkey, Israel, and the United States, completing a trend begun with the election as Prime Minister of pro-Western Nikol Pashinyan in 2018. 

Due to these developments, a recent wave of US-based, pro-Azerbaijan security specialists has been advocating for further Azerbaijan-West integration. The most prominent and active of the foregoing proponents, Joseph Epstein, has claimed that it is now prime time to engage with Azerbaijan and incorporate it with the United States and Israel. He has also recommended making it a signatory to the Abraham Accords and has hailed the Israeli-Azerbaijan partnership. Michael Doran, a former senior director in the National Security Council, has recently also argued for Azerbaijan-West integration as a bulwark against both Iran and Russia. Seth Crompsey, a former Department of State official, has additionally voiced support for further integrating Azerbaijan and solidifying it as both an ally of Israel and the United States. Brenda Shaffer, a foreign policy scholar and Azerbaijan lobbyist, similarly praised the Trump administration for signing several economic agreements with Azerbaijan. The underpinning similarity that they have had in common is that they have seen Azerbaijan-West integrationism as a strategic means to encircle Iran and threaten Russia from the south.

These arguments have not accounted for the dangers of expanding US-Israeli-Turkish commitments in the region. Azerbaijan is sandwiched between Russia and Iran, which arguably have higher geopolitical stakes in the South Caucasus than both nations. Subsequently, they would be naturally more willing to take military action against perceived threats in their backyard. I claim that the United States' and Israel’s engagement in excessive alignment with Azerbaijan will embolden its already high self-confidence, leading to further aggression on its part.  A more militant Azerbaijan, aligned with the US and its allies, would risk drawing the United States into potential crises with Russia and Iran, threatening an already overdrawn US military presence. I propose a more cautious approach towards Azerbaijan’s growing regional ambitions. The United States should capitalize on economic opportunities with Azerbaijan, but should maintain pressure on its government and its allies to avoid hostilities with its neighbors and disavow any security commitments with the nation. 

Historical Overview of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy

Azerbaijan gained its independence from the USSR in 1991. Despite some variation of the country’s foreign policy strategy during its early years, it became solidified after the Aliyev family took hold of Azerbaijani politics in 1993. Its policy approach then became strategic soft balancing. Instead of pursuing a sycophantic pro-Russian policy or an aggressive pro-Western one (both approaches that backfired in the 1991-1993 period), the country began to hedge its international relations. It did so by pursuing strategic partnerships with some countries and avoiding provocation toward any country (with the exception of Armenia). However, it did so while maintaining its sovereignty as one of its core interests. Heydar Aliyev, the former Azerbaijani president, laconically stated that “Azerbaijan does not want to be an enemy with any country. At the same time, we will not become victim to another country’s policies. Azerbaijan has its own independent policy.” This balanced foreign policy thus assumed more of a pragmatic character. For instance, it led Aliyev to annul many treaties with NATO member Turkey signed during the brief pro-Western presidency of Abdulfaz Elchibey, dismiss 1,600 Turkish military experts, and restore Moscow-Baku relations to avoid an unbalanced relationship with any particular regional power.

After the resignation of Heydar Aliyev in 2003, his son, Ilham Aliyev, became president, which he still is to the present day. While consolidating the power of his presidential post, he had essentially retained the balanced foreign policy approach of his father. During Ilham’s time in office, several events happened that reshaped Azerbaijan’s perception of the Kremlin’s attitudes toward the region. Though relations between the two nations were warmer in the first several years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, tensions rose after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. As a consequence thereof, Azerbaijan’s fears of Russian regional ambitions were validated, leading Azerbaijan to double down on its soft balancing strategy. It began to pursue other regional projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway in partnership with Turkey and the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, in an effort to decrease its economic interdependence with Russia. Subsequently, ties with Europe and the West were strengthened as Europe sought out non-Russian energy sources. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 further increased tension between the two countries. The offensive reinforced the view that Russia has not been willing to abandon its historic sphere of influence, and thus created anxiety among prominent members of Azerbaijani society.

Relations with Russia have also taken a turn for the worse, beginning in  December 2024, when an Azerbaijani commercial airplane bound for Kazakhstan crashed. It was later discovered that a misfired Russian missile struck the flight. Putin subsequently expressed condolences, but did not assume responsibility or say that the plane was shot down. Furthermore, in June 2025, the Russian government organized a raid against Azerbaijani property owners in Yekaterinburg, leading to the death of two Azeri brothers. This promptly led Aliyev to arrest two Baku-based Russian employees of the state-controlled Sputnik media agency. This incident has marked the nadir of Kremlin-Baku relations since 1991. Matters have only grown worse as Aliyev began to double down on his support for Ukraine since both incidents. Russia seems to have retaliated by striking refineries of Azerbaijan’s state-run oil agency (SOCAR) within Ukraine, which prompted Azerbaijan to consider sending military aid to Ukraine.

Another party keen on maintaining leverage in Azerbaijan has been Iran. Alexander Murinson writes that ever since the USSR collapsed, Iran has tried to sway the newly independent Turkic states, such as Azerbaijan, towards itself. Iran has supported organizations that have improved the public opinion of the Islamic Republic in Azerbaijan. Some of these have been humanitarian organizations, such as the Iranian Cultural Relations Organization (ICRO), which is aimed at assisting individuals in poverty. Besides that, Iran has backed the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, an anti-Israel party that was banned under Heydar’s presidency. As such, Azerbaijan has continued to maintain partnerships with Iran’s adversaries on its periphery, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and increasingly Israel, to counterpoise Iranian leverage. 

Azerbaijan’s Recent Pivot Away from Soft-Balancing

To balance against these growing threats from Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan has been strongly turning to Turkey, Israel, and the United States. President Ilham Aliyev developed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was started under his father in 2003, and organized the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline as well. He thus gained more economic independence from Russia while strengthening Azerbaijan’s energy ties with Turkey and Georgia. Capitalizing on their growing economic ties, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a mutual defense agreement in 2010, committing one another to support each other in the event of an attack by a foreign adversary. Since then, their defense ties have grown, with Turkey providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to their Turkic partner. In Azerbaijan’s recurring conflicts with Armenia, Turkey has been their largest supporter, providing drones, training, and other military support. This relationship was eventually enhanced with the Shusha Declaration in 2021, which significantly expanded their mutual security and economic cooperation, turning the relationship into an official alliance.

Azerbaijan has additionally forged strong economic, diplomatic, and security ties with Israel. Economically, Azerbaijan’s rich hydrocarbon reserves supply roughly 40% of Israel’s oil supply. In turn, Israeli firms have invested in Azerbaijan’s energy sector and have further assisted it with its agriculture, water desalination, electronics, and other industries. Both countries have furthermore exchanged leaders and high-ranking military officials, and have even engaged in lobbying on behalf of one another in the United States. One such effort was illustrated when Azerbaijan’s finance minister spoke at a conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in early 2020.

The two states have additionally been eager to engage in significant military cooperation.  Israel has become one of Azerbaijan’s  main arms suppliers, selling it many key armaments in multiple arms deals, including light machine guns, anti-tank guided missiles, surveillance drones, and air defense systems.  The equipment from these arms deals was eventually critical to securing Azerbaijani victories in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenia. Besides that, both states have also had close, long-lasting intelligence cooperation. Ronen Cohen and Tzvi Lev report that Israel established listening posts along the Azerbaijan-Iran border, with Azerbaijan’s approval, in the 1990s. Since then, Azerbaijan has permitted “teeming” amounts of Mossad agents to operate on its territory, according to alleged Israeli intelligence operatives. Moreover, the New York Times stated in September 2019 that American satellites spotted Israeli surveillance drones taking off from Azerbaijan to photograph Iran’s nuclear facilities. Finally, Haaretz stated in 2023 that “Azerbaijan has allowed the Mossad to set up a forward branch to monitor what is happening in Iran... and has even prepared an airfield intended to aid Israel in the case it decides to attack Iranian nuclear sites.” All of these developments clearly underscore the close relationship between the two, especially as both powers have sought to curb Iranian influence.

The October 7 attacks on Israel have intensified military cooperation between the two nations. According to the above testimony, it is possible that Azerbaijan let Israel use its airspace and airbases to attack Iranian targets. However, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry has disclaimed any responsibility for such attacks. Azerbaijan giving access to its airspace to Israel is, nonetheless, something that Iran claims and has spoken out about. This has, in turn, increased strain between Azerbaijan and Iran. 

As they strengthen ties with regional partners, they have sought closer relations with the United States. In addition, the visit of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to the White House in August 2025 created an agreement forming a US presence across the Zanzegur corridor. The “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) would employ American contractors to oversee the construction and operation of a land route across Armenia to Azerbaijan and its exclave, for 99 years. This route runs along Armenia’s border with Iran, potentially blocking its access to Yerevan, Tehran’s security partner. This has thus been something that Iran has also virulently opposed, and has hence threatened to occupy it if it does come into fruition. Azerbaijan has also joined NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan, again as an attempt to balance against its neighbors, though in a less provocative way than by directly joining the alliance.    

The foreign policy strategy of Azerbaijan may have slowly begun to transform into a paradigm of bandwagoning with Turkey, Israel, and the United States, and increasing hostility against Russia and Iran. While it doesn’t look like Azerbaijan has adopted this attitude in full yet, several conduits exist for it to develop in this way. A prime mover for this development would likely be Israel. As it has been the main driver of anti-Tehran rhetoric and military action, it could continue to influence Azerbaijan more over time and motivate adversarial attitudes. Another influence would be the advocacy of stronger ties between the United States and Azerbaijan by pro-alliance figures in US policymaking circles, which could embolden Azerbaijan to more aggressively face its rivals. 

Policy Proposal in Response to Alignment Advocates

The regional flare-up has, as seen earlier, been accompanied by calls for closer geopolitical integration with Azerbaijan. Proposals to do so have emphasized the potential benefits while minimizing the drawbacks. According to the reasoning of Epstein, Saffer, Doran, Cromspey, and other supporters of stronger ties with Azerbaijan, the United States and its allies would improve their security position vis-à-vis Iran and Russia by providing a foothold in the South Caucasus, separating both nations. They also emphasize that securing Azerbaijan as a friendly state to the West would also strengthen energy ties with Europe, bolstering the continent’s independence from Russian energy imports.

It is undeniable that if Azerbaijan is to pursue stronger ties with the United States and its allies, it would create a major stressor in its already strained relationships with Iran and Russia. In particular, Azerbaijan's assimilation into a Western security framework would embolden the country to adopt a brash foreign policy. Azerbaijan will be keener to act in more aggressive ways against its rivals, further antagonizing them and potentially dragging the United States and its allies into its crises. Additionally, these ties would drive Russia and Iran to forge stronger ties with one another. It would also entice both to intervene even further in Azerbaijan’s domestic politics to bring about circumstances favorable to themselves. It could even potentially lead Russia and Iran to take military action against Azerbaijan to deter further bandwagoning with their adversaries. Such a conflict would dramatically increase the risk of large-scale conflict. If US, Israeli, or Turkish assets are attacked in Azerbaijan by either Russia or Iran, they may respond with military force, leading to an escalatory cycle of conflict. 

To avoid this scenario, I propose that the United States assume a foreign policy that is centered on restraint. Alignment with an increasingly adversarial Azerbaijan would only be a conduit for further entanglement, not only in the Mideast, but also vis-à-vis Russia. This would thus only harm US national interest, not aid it, as a confrontation between only Iran would likely lead to a prolonged conflict that would take away American lives, resources, and morale. It would likewise breed Middle Eastern anti-Americanism and lead to more regional instability, as has been shown in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. For obvious reasons, a potential confrontation with Russia over the issue would be even more disastrous, as it risks dragging the whole of NATO into a conflict on an unprecedented scale. As such, by categorizing entanglement as harmful to US interests and seeing that unconditional alignment would likely lead to it, we can rule it out and instead engage more judiciously.

It would instead be best to focus on continuing the status quo as it had existed before October 7, i.e., to advocate for Azerbaijan to readopt its historic policy of soft balancing. The United States should then make further engagement (economic, security, etc.) with Azerbaijan conditional upon not provoking its big neighbors. In case Azerbaijan acts aggressively, the United States should disengage from Azerbaijan until it becomes open to the former approach. Regarding Turkey and Israel, it should also pressure them to adopt this approach through economic and diplomatic means. Finally, it would be best to reconsider whether the US-led TRIPP plan is within the national interest, as it seems to primarily benefit Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Israel while provoking already high regional tensions.

Engaging in this paradigm would lower the risk of entanglement for the United States while still reaping the benefits of economic and energy opportunities with Azerbaijan. It would likewise reduce the risk of large-scale war that would lead to countless losses of life and destruction, and would instead usher in greater regional stability.
    
Nick Tselikov is a Research Fellow at the Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs.