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By Laszlo Debrier and Maya Kohute Policy Recommendation  American workers lack labor protections compared to workers in other developed economies. Despite broad support, the U.S. is the only OECD country that lacks national paid maternity leave. Similarly, while Norway and Germany guarantee 25 and 20 paid vacation days a year, respectively, American workers get zero. Despite significant inflation, American minimum wage workers have received no wage increase since 2009. To expand worker protections, the US should implement aspects of the Norwegian and German tripartite models by reforming the National Labor Relations Board to facilitate collective bargaining between labor and business in collaboration rather than in competition. Only by balancing the interests of business and labor can consistent increases in labor rights be assured. Tripartism
Tripartism is a model for labor relations based on cooperative bargaining, with cyclical negotiations and enforced collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The “tri” in “tripartism” represents the three parties collaborating: labor, companies, and the government. In negotiation, tripartism makes corporations equal partners to organized labor, protecting corporate interests while empowering workers. The government actively facilitates negotiation but doesn’t dictate its outcomes. Individuals are represented by multiple unions on various levels of negotiation, creating overlapping CBAs and providing more expansive coverage and representation for negotiating parties. Tripartism has played a major role in shaping the development of European labor law and labor relations institutions. Through effectively facilitating tripartite CBA negotiations, these institutions have created strong labor protections while maintaining business interests. American Labor Relations In 1935, the U.S. passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), codifying union election and labor negotiation rules. To enforce these rules, the NLRA also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In addition to enforcement, the NLRB facilitated CBA negotiation in a tripartite manner, bypassing sluggish legislative processes. Both facilitation and enforcement were overseen by 26 regional offices and a presidentially appointed, Senate-approved national body called “The Board”. While the NLRA’s union regulations remain current law, the NLRB’s role has shifted since its establishment. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act removed the NLRB’s ability to facilitate binding agreements, leaving the U.S. without a viable government facilitator or a tripartite institution. In addition to the lack of a tripartite institution, modern American labor law prevents a tripartite model. The National Labor Relations Act mandates that each worker can only be represented by one union, preventing the overlapping system of unions and union federations required for a tripartite system. And while the NLRA requires individual businesses to negotiate with organized labor unions, it does not oblige employer associations to do the same, discouraging multi-company, sectoral bargaining. Even if employer associations frequently negotiated, the Sherman Antitrust Act makes inter-company wage agreements set by employer associations illegal. While the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act provide an exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act for wage agreements negotiated by unions, the 1945 Supreme Court case Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers ruled that this exception does not apply if employers and unions cooperate for mutual benefit. The sole extent of U.S. tripartism today is the Department of Labor, which recommends private judges to preside over CBA negotiations. However, it does not directly mediate, facilitate, or enforce CBA negotiations as tripartism requires. Tripartite Labor Law in Europe Germany Germany’s robust labor relations institutions primarily consist of labor courts that design and mediate agreements between employers and employees. These courts, divided among federal states, facilitate industry-specific CBAs between employer associations and union confederations. CBAs are enforced through the executive and judicial branches. While Germany has a high rate of union membership, CBA coverage is not universal, leaving gaps where labor protection increases are not ensured. To rectify this, the German parliament passed the 2014 Minimum Wage Act, or Mindestlohngesetz, to ensure wage increases regardless of CBA coverage. The Minimum Wage Act set a national minimum wage of €8.50 and created a tripartite Minimum Wage Commission to negotiate wage increases every two years. The Minimum Wage Commission is composed of three union representatives, three employer association representatives, and two non-voting advisors to balance the needs of business and labor. Norway Like Germany, Norway has similar tripartite institutions. However, they function almost exclusively through the executive branch. In Norway, the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion regulates internal labor disputes through industry-specific executive commissions. In the Norwegian petroleum industry, the ministry works through executive agencies to expedite labor-related resolutions and mediate negotiations between unions and employers. In addition, the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion helped to create the "Tariffnemnda", or Tariff Board, which facilitates, adjudicates, and extends collective labor agreements in industries deemed susceptible to labor exploitation. The Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion follows the "Frontfag", which forms collective bargaining agreements aimed at developing fair negotiations in export-oriented industries every 2 years. These institutions create a routine negotiating process through executive agencies in the Norwegian economy. Both the German and Norwegian tripartite models have resulted in great success. Germany’s model has created varied CBAs between industrial sectors, with industry-specific pension programs, sick pay guarantees, and layoff protection. Norway has established a comprehensive social safety net through CBAs, with strong pension programs, wage guarantees, insurance programs, and layoff protections for both employers and employees. Tripartism’s Success Tripartite negotiation’s great strength lies in its flexibility, allowing labor negotiation to supplement or substitute for legislation without relying on the slow bureaucratic legislative process. Germany’s Minimum Wage Commission raised the minimum wage to €13.90 in 2026, 12 years after the passage of the Minimum Wage Act. Rather than a result of new legislation, this minimum wage increase was the product of a routine collaborative tripartite process. While Norway differs from Germany in lacking a minimum wage, high-coverage sectoral bargaining sets de facto wage floors. Norway’s lack of a minimum wage does not entail income disparity. When comparing GINI coefficients, Norway has lower economic inequality than Germany, with coefficients of 26.5 and 32.4, respectively (though both nations have significantly less wealth inequality than the US, with a coefficient of 41.8). Germany and Norway’s comparatively low levels of inequality, without consistent wage legislation, demonstrate the ultimate strength of a tripartite system: steady increases in labor rights regardless of legislative action. Germany and Norway demonstrate that these robust labor protections do not come at the cost of burdening businesses or reducing productivity, as strong employer associations ensure the needs of businesses are adequately represented in facilitated negotiation. In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking, a measure of 41 factors relevant to commerce, including resource accessibility, regulatory burden, and compliance costs, the U.S. ranked sixth, Norway ranked ninth, and Germany ranked 22nd of 190 nations. When measuring for economic productivity, Norway significantly outperforms the United States in purchasing power parity adjusted for GDP per work hour, with $132.28 to $97.05 USD, with Germany close behind at $93.72. Even taking the negative effects of labor protections as a given, they do not stop tripartite nations like Germany and Norway from maintaining comparable, or even superior, business and economic efficacy with the United States. Recommendation Given the success of the German and Norwegian tripartite models, the United States should reform the NLRB into a tripartite agency. NLRB reformation must come through legislative reform; Congress should amend the NLRA and Sherman Antitrust Act to require employer associations to negotiate with labor and allow for overlapping unions. Once this labor law change has occurred, the NLRB should be restructured into a tripartite institution able to facilitate collective bargaining and ensure wage increases. The United States is a heavily populated, geographically massive, and economically diverse state with a constitution that limits policymaking to the executive and legislative branches. To account for these factors, the tripartite NLRB must be a Norwegian-style executive agency with German-style federalism and a CBA-determined bargaining cycle. Facilitation boards, akin to German regional labor courts, should be added to the NLRB's 26 regional offices to facilitate collective bargaining within their respective jurisdictions. “The Board’s” role should expand to facilitate collective bargaining involving parties within multiple jurisdictions. To accommodate regional economic differences, CBAs facilitated by “The Board” must not mandate wage increases. When wages are negotiated through collective bargaining facilitated by “The Board”, regional divisions of the parties must negotiate separate wage-determining CBAs through regional office facility boards in every jurisdiction where both parties operate. While wage mandating CBAs greatly increase worker wages, sectoral bargaining coverage depends on union membership and is not always de facto law, as seen in the German system. In the 1990s, German union membership declined, causing CBA coverage to fall and prompting Germany's Minimum Wage Act. The U.S’s significantly lower union membership would make CBA coverage an even greater issue. As such, NLRB regional offices should implement minimum wage commissions, separate from their facilitative boards, modeled on Germany’s Minimum Wage Commission. Regional minimum wages would apply to all workers regardless of CBA coverage, ensuring a steady wage increase independent of union bargaining. Facilitated CBAs would use the minimum wage as a floor to potentially negotiate higher wages for party organizations. Regional office minimum wage commissions can emulate the German Minimum Wage Commission’s fair representation of party groups by adapting the structure of Federal Reserve regional bank boards, with three labor representatives elected by regional union confederations, three business representatives elected by employer associations, and “The Board” appointing three representatives of public interest. Conclusion A tripartite American institution would be a reconstitution of the NLRB’s original purpose: to improve workers’ rights while promoting business interests through cooperative dialogue. Tripartite institutions have improved labor conditions in Germany and Norway, providing a framework that the U.S. could adapt to strengthen its own labor system. Policymakers should amend obstructive legislation and move forward by strengthening the NLRB to protect American workers. Laszlo Debrier is a first-year undergraduate student at the University of Washington's Department of History Maya Kohute is a first-year undergraduate student at the University of Washington studying Political Science, Economics, and Philosophy.
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